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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1
The Artificial Intelligence Law and Policy Institute (“AILPI”) is a not-forprofit organization that promotes equality and transparency in the digital community
by educating the public regarding equality and transparency in technology, artificial
intelligence, machine learning, and algorithmic fairness. AIPLI fosters discussion
and spearheads policy analysis of the legal and social issues raised by these subjects
and other important technology-related public policy matters. AIPLI conducts and
participates in litigation in the public interest to preserve equality and transparency
in technology and the digital community.
As part of its mission, AIPLI prepares and files amicus curiae briefs in cases
with broad implications for the future of Americans’ (and people the world over’s)
digital experience—cases like this one. The rapid, unchecked growth of powerful
machine learning and algorithmic targeting technologies over the past half decade
has transformed the modern Internet. Online content is, for all intents and purposes,
now an infinite repository; one indexed, curated, and presented to users in digestible
form by powerful algorithmic tools built and deployed by companies like Google.

1

All parties consent to the submission of this amicus brief. No counsel for a
party has authored this brief in whole or in part, and no party, party’s counsel, or any
other person—other than amicus curiae and its counsel—has contributed money that
was intended to fund preparing or submitting this brief. There is no relationship
between AIPLI or its attorneys and petitioners or petitioners’ counsel.
1
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These content algorithms are not accidental, and they are not headless—they are
designed to learn from data and to pursue defined objectives, and they control what
human persons see, hear, and experience when they go online.
In this case, Google is alleged to have used its powerful targeting technology
to affirmatively surface ISIS videos to users that Google’s data tools determined
would be particularly interested in ISIS videos. This is, according to the operative
complaint in this matter, a violation of a federal criminal law—the Anti-Terrorism
Act. Google, however, has argued that its algorithmic recommendation and
surfacing of ISIS videos is “neutral” and “passive,” and moreover that its conduct,
even if it violates the Anti-Terrorism Act, is immunized by Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act. The panel below held that this was the case, and in
doing so adopted as Ninth Circuit law some truly dangerous (and objectively wrong)
interpretations of what Section 230 means, and how it interacts with other federal
statutes and policies.
AILPI is concerned by the implications of the panel opinion in this case.
However, AILPI also recognizes that the panel below believed that many of its
holdings were required by this Court’s precedent. Accordingly, AILPI respectfully
submits that it is time for this circuit to revisit its Section 230 jurisprudence from the
ground up—to forestall a decade of increasingly dystopian decisions given the
growing role of algorithmic content technologies in the fabric of our everyday lives.

2
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This is a case in which the panel decision is unambiguously wrong, with
potentially wide-ranging—and deleterious—implications for the next decade of
jurisprudence in this circuit. It is impossible to square the outcome below (in which
Google’s algorithmic recommendation of ISIS videos to persons likely to be
interested in ISIS, in alleged contravention of the federal Anti-Terrorism Act, was
held to be statutorily immunized by Section 230 of the Communications Decency
Act) with the actual text and history of Section 230. There is, simply put, no
reasonable tabula rasa reading of the Communications Decency Act in which
Google’s conduct, if proved, could be immunized from Anti-Terrorism Act liability
by Section 230.
However, this is also a case (as multiple panel members expressly observed)
in which much of the wrongness was foisted upon the panel below by this Court’s
precedent: to wit, more than a decade of creeping errors in the Ninth Circuit’s
Section 230 decisions, from Carafano, to Roommates, to Kimzey, to Dyroff—and
many other opinions along the way. For nearly twenty years, this circuit has read
into Section 230 mandates that are simply absent from the statutory text or history;
has declined to seriously reckon with the meaning of Section 230(e) et seq., both
through its subparts and as a separately existing whole; and has applied an already
unsupportable “test” in blindered ways that ignore the manner in which the

3
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technology of the modern Internet, and particularly algorithmic decisionmaking,
actually works. This needs to be corrected via en banc review. The alternative is to
continue along an objectively incorrect interpretive path with respect to Section
230—one that does not properly give effect to unambiguous congressional intent—
with a near-certainty of increasingly erroneous results in the Federal Reporter over
the next several years.
The Gonzalez plaintiffs’ petition presents a particularly appropriate vehicle
for this circuit to convene en banc and right its interpretive wrongs with respect to
Section 230. As set forth below, this case squarely presents three important, likelyto-recur interpretive problems with this circuit’s Section 230 jurisprudence, each of
which infected the panel decision below.
ARGUMENT
I.

IT IS AN ABSURD RESULT TO HOLD THAT SECTION 230
IMMUNIZES CONDUCT THAT AFFIRMATIVELY SURFACES,
RATHER THAN BLOCKS OR SCREENS, OFFENSIVE MATERIAL.
The panel decision—purportedly applying this Court’s decisions in Carafano

v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003), Fair Hous. Council of San
Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc),2

2

This Court may overrule or clarify not just panel decisions like Carafano
and Dyroff, but limited en banc decisions like Roommates, upon en banc rehearing
of this case. See, e.g., U.S. v. Aguila-Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d 915, 916-17 (9th Cir.
2011) (en banc) (overruling-in-part Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1063 (9th

4
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Kimzey v. Yelp!, Inc., 835 F.3d 1263 (9th Cir. 2016), and Dyroff v. Ultimate Software
Grp., Inc., 934 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2019)—determined that Google’s algorithmic
surfacing and recommendation of ISIS videos to users determined to be likely to be
interested in ISIS videos (alleged in the Third Amended Complaint in Gonzalez at,
for example, ¶¶ 534-55, see ER 182-85) was statutorily immunized by Section 230
of the Communications Decency Act. See Gonzalez v. Google LLC, 2 F.4th 871,
892-97 (9th Cir. 2021).
This was a perverse result given the unambiguous Congressional intent behind
Section 230—to permit and incentivize blocking and screening of offensive material
by service providers, in order to make the nascent Internet less of a morass of
criminality and harassment, not more. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 230 (“Protection for
private blocking and screening of offensive material”); id. § 230(c) (“Protection for
‘Good Samaritan blocking and screening of offensive material”); id. § 230(b)(3)
(“[It is the policy of the United States—] to encourage the development of
technologies which maximize user control over what information is received by
individuals, families, and schools who use the Internet and other interactive
computer services; id. § 230(b)(4) (“[It is the policy of the United States—] to
remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering

Cir. 2007) (en banc)), abrogated on other grounds by Descamps v. United States,
570 U.S. 254 (2013).
5
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technologies that empower parents to restrict their children’s access to objectionable
or inappropriate online material”); id. § 230(b)(5) (“[It is the policy of the United
States—] to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and
punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of computer.”).
As the Senate Conference Report explained section 230 immediately prior to
its enactment:
The conference agreement adopts the House provision
with minor modifications as a new section 230 of the
Communications Act. This section provides “Good
Samaritan” protections from civil liability for providers or
users of an interactive computer service for actions to
restrict or to enable restriction of access to objectionable
online material. One of the specific purposes of this
section is to overrule Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy and any
other similar decisions which have treated such providers
and users as publishers or speakers of content that is not
their own because they have restricted access to
objectionable material. The conferees believe that such
decisions create serious obstacles to the important federal
policy of empowering parents to determine the content of
communications their children receive through interactive
computer services.
S. Conf. Rep. 104-230 (1996), at p. 194 (emphasis added).
Yet despite all the above—words stacked on words stacked on words, from
statutory text to authoritative legislative history—making indisputable that Congress
passed Section 230, including its subsection (c)(1), to permit and incentivize
“restrict[ing] access to objectionable material” in order to keep Internet users safe,

6
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the panel decision here expressly holds that Section 230 immunizes conduct3 by a
service provider that affirmatively surfaces objectionable—and indeed, dangerously
criminal—content and targets it to users who might be uniquely influenced by it.
See Gonzalez, 2 F.4th at 892-97. Nothing in the text or structure of Section 230
compels this result; the bare language that one user or provider “shall not be treated
as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information
content provider” is, by its plain terms, irrelevant to whether Google has violated the
Anti-Terrorism Act as alleged in the case below.
Nonetheless, the panel held that Section 230(c)(1) not only applies to the
opposite of the behavior it was indisputably intended to encompass, but immunizes
alleged violations of federal anti-terrorism laws by one of the world’s largest and
most powerful corporations, solely because of a creepingly-erroneous chain of
decisions by this Court attempting to give effect to Section 230(c)(1) in various cases
without ever revisiting first principles. It is time for a reboot.
To the extent the panel’s holding was required by this Court’s precedents in
Carafano, Roommates, and/or Dyroff, those cases and their progeny must be

3

To the extent that Google has argued, and various prior decisions have held,
that algorithmic surfacing and targeting of content is not “conduct” by the developer
that creates and deploys such algorithms, this is a complete misapprehension of how
machine learning, artificial intelligence, and algorithmic decisionmaking works on
the modern Internet, as explained in greater detail in Section III of this amicus brief,
infra.
7
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overruled or limited so as to permit the unambiguously correct statutory result: that
Section 230 does not immunize an Internet service provider’s affirmative surfacing
of offensive (and indeed, criminal) material. This can be done while still attempting
to give effect to the words of Section 230(c)(1)—but this circuit’s standard needs to
take into account the purpose and structure of Section 230 as a whole, and most
critically the section’s unambiguously constrained scope (to enable blocking and
filtering) and its separately-enumerated subsection, § 230(e) et seq., that expressly
defines Section 230’s “Effect on other laws.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1)-(5).
The interpretation of Section 230(c)(1) articulated by the panel below, which
not only ignores the fact that Google’s alleged conduct is the direct logical opposite
of the conduct Section 230 was enacted to protect and incentivize, but repeatedly
avoids rigorous engagement with Section 230(e) et seq., despite that subsection’s
obvious pertinence to the issues here (see, e.g., Gonzalez, 2 F.4th at 890 (rebuffing
argument § 230(e)(1) precludes § 230(c) immunity for Google’s actions); id. at 891
n.9 (ignoring express distinctions between State and federal laws in the text of
§ 230(e) et seq. and in this Court’s Section 230 decisions4)), is not a permissible
method of statutory interpretation under this Court’s precedent, given that it both
ignores known Congressional intent and embraces an absurd result. See, e.g.,

4

See, e.g., Barnes v. Yahoo! Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1097 (9th Cir. 2009).
8
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Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309, AFL-CIO v. Laidlaw Transit Services, Inc.,
435 F.3d 1140, 1145-46 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that “less” means “more” based on
a clearly expressed legislative intent from purpose and context).5
Here, there can be no dispute that the conduct alleged by the Gonzalez
plaintiffs—that Google algorithmically recommends ISIS videos to users that
Google has determined through data-mining and the application of machine-learning
algorithms to be likely to be interested in ISIS videos (see, e.g., ER 182-85 (TAC
¶¶ 534-55))—is not passive or neutral activity, but rather concrete action by Google
to surface and matchmake videos promoting terrorism to persons determined by
Google to be likely to be interested in videos promoting terrorism.
This is not an action by an Internet service provider to block or screen
offensive conduct—it is the exact opposite. It is content, created, curated, and
presented—tailored to the viewer—by machine-learning systems provided with
mathematically discernable objectives by Google. Put simply, the algorithms create
content for the viewer.

5

Even under the flip side of the coin, see Amalgamated Transit Union Local
1309, AFL-CIO v. Laidlaw Transit Services, Inc., 448 F.3d 1092, 1094-1100 (9th
Cir. 2006) (Bybee, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc), Google fares no
better: the plain language of Section 230(c)(1) simply says that a provider “shall
[not] be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider.” It does not expressly preclude, limit, or immunize
any sort of legal claim. In order to find such language in section 230 (aside from that
in § 230(c)(2)), the Court must look to Section 230(e) (“Effect on other laws”).
9
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Whatever the precise sweep of Section 230(c) et seq.’s protections for
providers of interactive computer services, the section cannot possibly encompass
the direct logical opposite of the express reason that Congress promulgated it. There
is no textual basis for this upside-down reading of Section 230(c), and all available
sources of congressional intent behind the section affirmatively rule out such an
interpretation. Yet this is what the panel below held—purportedly on constraint of
this circuit’s precedents. En banc review is required to prevent an absurd result.
II.

THE PANEL DECISION PLAINLY RUNS AFOUL OF SECTION
230(E)(1), AS BARRING CIVIL REMEDIES FOR VIOLATIONS OF
THE ANTI-TERRORISM ACT IMPAIRS THE ENFORCEMENT OF
A FEDERAL CRIMINAL STATUTE.
In a single paragraph devoid of substantive analysis, the panel held that the

Gonzalez plaintiffs’ claims under the federal Anti-Terrorism Act could be barred by
Section 230 despite an express provision, Section 230(e)(1), stating that “Nothing in
this section shall be construed to impair the enforcement of . . . any . . . Federal
criminal statute.” See Gonzalez, 2 F.4th at 890. The basis for the panel’s holding on
this point was that Section 230(e)(1) “extends only to criminal prosecutions, and not
civil actions based on criminal statutes.” Id. The panel offered no actual substantive
argument in favor of this holding; it simply cited to other circuit’s decisions on that
point, adopted the above “only . . . criminal prosecutions” holding on behalf of the
Ninth Circuit, then moved along. The panel’s decision on this incredibly important
issue was wrong, with potentially widespread future implications not just for federal
10
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Anti-Terrorism Act cases, but for cases brought under the federal Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) as well.
First, the panel’s holding that Section 230(e)(1) “extends only to criminal
prosecutions” is nowhere in—and in fact, contrary to—the plain language of Section
230(e)(1): “Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair the enforcement of
section 223 or 231 of this title, chapter 71 (relating to obscenity) or 110 (relating to
sexual exploitation of children) of Title 18, or any other Federal criminal statute.”
The plain language of Section 230(e)(1) does not admit the additional requirement
that the provision “extends only to criminal prosecutions”—especially since
numerous federal criminal statutes, including the Anti-Terrorism Act itself—were
expressly legislated by Congress to include multiple means of “enforcement.” The
“only … criminal prosecutions” limitation adopted ipse dixit by the panel below is
not in the statute—and it was error for the panel to add it. See Church of Scientology
of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 612 F.2d 417, 421 (9th Cir. 1979) (“[I]n the vast
majority of its legislation Congress does mean what it says and thus the statutory
language is normally the best evidence of congressional intent.”).
Second, there can be no serious dispute (although the panel decision
essentially elides this point) that the Anti-Terrorism Act is a “federal criminal
statute.” The Anti-Terrorism Act comprises twenty-one statutory subsections
codified as Chapter 113B within Part I of Title 18 of the United States Code. See 18

11
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U.S.C. §§ 2331-2339d. Title 18 of the United States Code covers “Crimes and
Criminal Procedure,” and its Part I is titled, “Crimes.” Within this statutory Part
directed toward federal “Crimes,” there are close to one hundred separate chapters,
ranging from “Contempts” (Chapter 21, 18 U.S.C. §§ 401-403), to “Fraud and False
Statements” (Chapter 47, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1040), to “Genocide” (Chapter 50A,
18 U.S.C. §§ 1091-1093). All of the chapters within Part I of Title 18 define federal
crimes (see, e.g., Chapter 17—Coins and Currency, 18 U.S.C. §§ 331-337
(enumerating seven distinct federal crimes relating to coins and currency)), but some
of the chapters in this Part also detail means of enforcement.
Two examples of the latter are Chapter 96—Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968), and Chapter 113B—Terrorism (18 U.S.C.
§§ 2331-2339d). Each of these chapters—Chapter 96 and Chapter 113B—(1)
expressly defines federal crimes (see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1962 (RICO “Definitions”
and “Prohibited Activities,” respectively); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331 and 2332a-2332i
(Terrorism “Definitions” and prohibited activities, including “Use of Weapons of
Mass Destruction,” “Missile Systems Designed to Destroy Aircraft,” and “Acts of
Nuclear Terrorism”); (2) expressly specifies “Criminal Penalties” (see 18 U.S.C.
§ 1963 (RICO); 18 U.S.C. § 2332 (Terrorism)); and (3) expressly specifies “Civil
Remedies” (see 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (RICO); 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (Terrorism)). The
language of 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a), which was enacted after RICO, parallels that of 18

12
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U.S.C. § 1964(c). There is no question based on structure, language, and context,
that both RICO (Chapter 96 of Part I of Title 18) and the Anti-Terrorism Act
(Chapter 113B of Part I of Title 18) are federal criminal statutes.
Next, the question under Section 230(e)(1) is whether precluding a lawsuit
under the enumerated “Civil Remedies” provision of a federal criminal statute—for
example, a RICO action under 18 U.S.C. § 1964 or an Anti-Terrorism Act action
under 18 U.S.C. § 2333—“impairs the enforcement” of that federal criminal statute
(i.e., RICO or the Anti-Terrorism Act). The answer is self-evidently “yes” under
basic, longstanding principles of statutory construction—the most obvious of which
is that Congress is assumed to have done things for a reason, and Congress expressly
designed certain federal criminal statutes in Part I of Title 18 (e.g., Chapter 96—
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, and Chapter 113B—
Terrorism), to have enumerated “Criminal Penalties” and “Civil Remedies”
provisions.
Congress may (indeed, must) be presumed to have legislated private
enforcement of certain federal criminal statutes (e.g., RICO, the Anti-Terrorism
Act), but not others (e.g., Coins and Currency), because Congress’s avowed,
intended scheme to enforce certain criminal statutes—including RICO and the AntiTerrorism Act—extends beyond federal prosecutions. This is the only reasonable
takeaway from the unique structure of Chapter 96—RICO and Chapter 113B—

13
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Terrorism within Part I of Title 18. And it is a takeaway endorsed in the RICO
context by the Supreme Court of the United States. See Agency Holding Corp. v.
Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 151 (1987) (civil remedies under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act “bring to bear the pressure of
‘private attorneys general’ on a serious national problem for which public
prosecutorial resources are deemed inadequate” (emphasis added)); cf. United
States v. Mays, 430 F.3d 963, 965-67 (9th Cir. 2005) (discussing Congressional
awareness and intent with respect to civil enforcement of criminal judgments: “By
specifically importing the FDCPA’s procedures into the MVRA, Congress clearly
meant to make those procedures available in criminal cases.”).
The panel decision ignored all of the above, instead holding without material
analysis that “§ 230(e)(1)’s limitation on § 230 immunity extends only to criminal
prosecutions . . . .” Gonzalez, 2 F.4th at 890. This was a serious error, with potentially
far-reaching implications, including on federal RICO violations by purported
interactive content providers.6

6

The panel recited, but did not analyze, the district court’s statement about
Section 230(e)(1) that “any ambiguity in the subsection’s text was resolved by its
title, “[n]o effect on criminal law.” (Id. (citations omitted).) Aside from the fact that
“[n]o effect on criminal law” doesn’t actually resolve any interpretive issue—and
aside from the fact that the language of 230(e)(1) is not, in fact, ambiguous—any
interpretive methodology in which the titles of Section 230 subsections are accorded
substantive weight in divining Congressional intent could not possibly support

14
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Excising civil remedies from criminal statutory schemes cripples the scope of
those statutes, and there is simply no evidence that Congress intended Section 230
to have such an effect. To the contrary, § 230(e)(1) evinces a clear intent not to
displace criminal statutory schemes. Congress could have easily said it was referring
to criminal prosecutions or actions brought by the government. It did not do so.
III.

THE PANEL’S ANALYSIS OF GOOGLE’S ALGORITHMIC
DECISIONMAKING MISUNDERSTANDS MODERN MACHINE
LEARNING/AI TECHNOLOGY AND CREATES A LIABILITY
VACUUM FOR ALGORITHMIC DECISIONS ATTRIBUTABLE TO
IDENTIFIABLE ACTORS LIKE GOOGLE.
Finally, the panel’s discussion and analysis—and the analysis of prior panel

decisions from this circuit, most notably Dyroff—of the role that content algorithms
play on the modern Internet, see Gonzalez, 2 F.4th at 892-97, is materially (and quite
concerningly) inaccurate. Per the panel below, although the TAC in this case
admittedly “alleges that Google recommends content—including ISIS videos—to
users based upon users’ viewing history and what is known about the users,” id. at
894, that same TAC is purportedly “devoid of any allegations that Google
specifically targeted ISIS content, or designed its website to encourage videos that
further the terrorist group’s mission,” id. at 895. This is not an accurate

immunizing Google’s alleged conduct here, given that the title of Section 230(c) is
“Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and screening of offensive material.”
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understanding of Google’s powerful—and purpose-built, and carefully deployed—
machine-learning technology.
Modern content surfacing, recommendation, and targeting algorithms like
those alleged to have been deployed by Google in this case are not “websites” that
are “neutral” to uploads. Rather, machine learning algorithmic tools like Google’s
carefully review and learn from each and every piece of content on Google’s
platform—and each and every action taken by a user on that platform—and then
affirmatively surface particular content from a vast number of videos based on
particular attributes.
These tools operate as designed, and learn as they do it. They are not bare “do
this, then that” instructions, nor are they unknown or unknowable pieces of
technology that operate in a vacuum. See generally Yavar Bathaee, The Artificial
Intelligence Black Box and the Failure of Intent and Causation, 31 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 889, 897-906 (2018) (describing the development and operation of artificial
intelligence technologies and machine-learning algorithms); cf. Yifat Nahmias and
Maayan Perel, The Oversight of Content Moderation by AI: Impact Assessments and
Their Limitations, 58 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 145, 171-83 (2021) (discussing algorithmic
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content moderation technologies deployed by YouTube and Facebook, among
others).7
Contrary to the panel’s assertion, “Google’s algorithms [do not] function like
traditional search engines that select particular content for users based on user
inputs,” Gonzalez, 2 F.4th at 897, and to hold Google immune from liability for the
positive, programmed actions of its algorithmic tools based on this misunderstanding
presages a troublesome liability vacuum over the next decade—because algorithms
will be the primary way in which some of the world’s largest and most pervasive
companies (including Google and Facebook) interact with their users in the 2020s.
A holding by this circuit—the home base of both Google and Facebook, and
the situs of forum selection clauses from both companies—that when users interact
with algorithms designed and deployed by an Internet provider, the actions of those
algorithms are not attributable to the provider who designed and deploys them, is
incredibly problematic. And, the holding is based on a factual premise that has
effectively been hardcoded in the law of this circuit—that machine-learning
algorithms are mere facilitation tools, not means of creating user-tailored content.
That factual error is at the very root of the panel’s reasoning here, 2 F.4th at 892-97,

7

The TAC in this case alleges that Google affirmatively surfaces and targets
ISIS content to users—not just that it fails to filter all of it. See, e.g., ER 182-85
(TAC ¶¶ 534-55); see also Gonzalez, 2 F.4th at 892.
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and is the hyper-factual centerpiece of this Court’s 2019 panel decision in Dyroff,
934 F.3d at 1097-99. Given the centrality, importance, and recurrence of this Court’s
errors on this issue, en banc review is warranted to correct this circuit’s treatment of
algorithmic decisionmaking under Section 230 even separate from the other errors
infecting the panel decision here.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should rehear this case en banc and hold
that Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act does not immunize any of the
Gonzalez plaintiffs’ federal Anti-Terrorism Act claims.
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